

Team semantics for natural language

The case of disjunction

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largely based on joint work with

Ivano Ciardelli and Jeroen Groenendijk



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Overall aims of the talk

- Provide **linguistic motivation** for team semantics
- Show how teams — sets of worlds / assignments — can be used to capture **inquisitive content**
- Show why this is useful, focusing on the case of **disjunction**
- In particular, show that taking inquisitive content into account allows us to **reconcile the two main views** on disjunction in natural language semantics

An inquisitive perspective on meaning

Point of departure

- A primary function of language is to **exchange information**
- Language is used both to **provide** and to **request** information
- Sentences have both **informative** and **inquisitive** potential
- Semantic theories have mainly focused on **informative** content; **inquisitive** content has received far less attention

Basic aim of our research programme

- Develop a semantic framework where meanings capture both **informative** and **inquisitive** content in a uniform way

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The case of disjunction

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I will illustrate the advantages of an inquisitive perspective on meaning, focusing on the case of **disjunction**

Two views on disjunction in natural language semantics

1. Classical view: disjunction as a **join** operator
2. Alternative semantics: disjunction **generates alternatives**

Reconciliation

- I will show that these two views can be **reconciled** if we adopt an inquisitive perspective on meaning
- When treated as a **join** operator in the inquisitive setting, disjunction automatically **generates alternatives**

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
Roadmap

1. Classical treatment of disjunction as a **join** operator
2. Alternative semantics: disjunction **generates alternatives**
3. How inquisitive semantics **reconciles** these two views
4. Some broader **repercussions** for semantics and logic

(based on Roelofsen '13, Ciardelli et.al. '13a)

Propositions in classical logic

- Propositions in classical logic are **sets of possible worlds**




- Intuitively, a proposition **carves out** a region in logical space
- In asserting a sentence, a speaker **provides** the **information** that the actual world is located in this region
- In this way propositions capture **informative content**

Entailment

- Propositions are **ordered** in terms of informative strength
- One proposition is **more informative** than another just in case it locates the actual world within a **smaller region**


$$A \models B \iff A \subseteq B$$




$p \wedge q$



p



$p \vee q$



$p \vee \neg p$

Algebraic operations

- Every ordered set has a certain algebraic structure, and comes with certain **basic algebraic operations**
- The set of classical propositions, ordered by entailment, forms a **complete Heyting algebra**
- This means that there are **three basic operations**:
 1. Meet (= greatest lower bound w.r.t. entailment)
 2. Join (= least upper bound w.r.t. entailment)
 3. Relative pseudo-complementation

Connectives in classical logic

In classical logic, these basic algebraic operations are taken to be expressed by **conjunction**, **disjunction**, and **implication**:

- $[\varphi \wedge \psi] = [\varphi] \cap [\psi]$ **meet**
- $[\varphi \vee \psi] = [\varphi] \cup [\psi]$ **join**
- $[\varphi \rightarrow \psi] = [\varphi] \Rightarrow [\psi]$ **relative pseudo-complement**

And negation expresses pseudo-complementation relative to \perp :

- $[\neg\varphi] = [\varphi] \Rightarrow \perp$ **pseudo-complement relative to \perp**

Linguistic relevance

- It is to be expected that **natural languages** generally also have ways to **express** these **basic operations** on meanings
- Just like they generally have ways to express basic operations on quantities, like **addition** and **subtraction**
- Certain words are indeed often taken to fulfill this purpose:
English: and, or, if, not
Dutch: en, of, als, niet
Finnish: ja, tai, jos, ei
- An algebraic perspective on meaning provides a simple explanation of the **cross-linguistic ubiquity** of such words
- This makes classical logic, in particular the treatment of **disjunction** as a **join** operator, **linguistically highly relevant**

Disjunction in alternative semantics

- Recently, however, many arguments have been made for an **alternative treatment** of disjunction in natural language
- These arguments involve a **wide range of constructions**:
 - modals
 - imperatives
 - counterfactuals
 - comparatives
 - conditional questions
 - unconditionals
 - alternative questions
 - sluicing
- Claim: **disjunction generates alternatives**

Kratzer & Shimoyama '02, Simons '05, Menendez-Benito '05, Alonso-Ovalle '06 '09, Aloni '07, Rawlins '08, Aloni & Port '10, AnderBois '11, Biezma & Rawlins '12, Ciardelli & Aloni '13, Aloni & Roelofsen '14, among others


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Generating alternatives

- Disjunction in **classical logic**:



- Disjunction in **alternative semantics**:




Illustration: counterfactuals

Scenario

Sally had a birthday party at her house, and some friends brought their instruments. One of her friends, Bart Balloon, has a terrible musical taste. Fortunately, he forgot to bring his trumpet.

- (1) If Bart Balloon had played the trumpet,
people would have left.

$\varphi > \psi$

Minimal change semantics

(Stalnaker '68, Lewis '73)

$\varphi > \psi$ is true in a world w iff among all the worlds that make φ true, those that **differ minimally** from w also make ψ true

Illustration: counterfactuals

Now consider a counterfactual with a **disjunctive antecedent**:

- (2) If **Bart Balloon or Louis Armstrong** had played the trumpet, people would have left.

Prediction

- The Stalnaker/Lewis treatment of counterfactuals, together with the classical treatment of disjunction, **wrongly predicts** that (2) is **true** in the above scenario
- Intuitively, this is because all worlds that make the antecedent true and differ minimally from the actual world are ones where **Bart Balloon** played the trumpet, and **not Louis Armstrong**
- Effectively, the **second disjunct** is **disregarded**

Illustration: counterfactuals

- Initially, this observation was presented as an argument against the Stalnaker/Lewis treatment of **counterfactuals**

(Fine '75, Nute '75, Ellis et.al. '77, Warmbrod '81)

- But another way to approach the problem, is to pursue an alternative treatment of **disjunction**

(Alonso-Ovalle '06 '09, van Rooij '06)

Indeed, if disjunction **generates alternatives** and if verifying $\varphi > \psi$ involves checking every alternative generated by φ , the problem is avoided

(see also Franke '09, Klinedinst '09, van Rooij '10 for pragmatic solutions)

Impasse

- Many arguments that **alternative semantics** provides a better account of the behavior of disjunction in natural language
- However:
 - It **forces us to give up the classical treatment** of disjunction as expressing one of the basic algebraic operations on meanings
 - We **no longer have a uniform treatment** of disjunction, conjunction, implication, and negation
 - We **no longer have an algebraic explanation** for the cross-linguistic ubiquity of disjunction-words
- We seem to have reached an **impasse**



The road to reconciliation

1. Classical propositions only capture informative content
2. We will consider a team semantics in which propositions capture both **informative** and **inquisitive** content
3. We will define a corresponding notion of **entailment**, sensitive to both informative and inquisitive content
4. As in the classical setting, we will find that the set of all propositions, ordered by entailment, forms a **Heyting algebra**
5. So we will have the same basic algebraic operations: **join**, **meet**, and **(relative) pseudo-complementation**
6. Treating **disjunction** as a **join** operator in this richer setting gives us exactly the desired **alternative generating** behavior

Basic notions

Worlds and states

- Assume, as before, a universe of possible worlds W
- As usual, construe information states / pieces of information as sets of possible worlds

Common ground

- Body of shared information established in the conversation
- Modeled as an information state (Stalnaker '78)

Propositions and utterance effects

Propositions

- A **proposition** is a non-empty, downward closed set of states
- Rooted in seminal work on questions (Ham'73, Kar'77, GS'84)
- But with a crucial twist: **downward closure**


The effects of an utterance

In uttering a sentence φ , a speaker:

1. **Steers the common ground** towards a state in $[\varphi]$
2. **Provides the information** that the actual world lies in $\cup[\varphi]$

Example

Suppose that φ expresses the following proposition:



Then, in uttering φ , a speaker:

- Steers the common ground towards a state that is contained in $\{w_1, w_2\}$ or in $\{w_1, w_3\}$
- Provides the information that the actual world is located in $\cup[\varphi] = \{w_1, w_2, w_3\}$

Settling propositions and downward closure

Settling a proposition



- A piece of information α **settles** a proposition \mathcal{P} iff mutual acceptance of α leads the cg to a state in \mathcal{P}
- This means that α settles $[\varphi]$ just in case $\alpha \in [\varphi]$

Downward closure

- We assume that if a proposition \mathcal{P} is settled by α , then it is also settled by any **stronger** piece of information $\beta \subset \alpha$
- Therefore, propositions are required to be **downward closed**


Alternatives

- Among all the states in a proposition \mathcal{P} , the ones that are **easiest to reach** are the ones that contain **least information**
- Visually, these states are **easy to identify**: they are the **maximal** elements of \mathcal{P}
- We call these states the **alternatives** in \mathcal{P} , and from now on, when visualizing propositions, we will **only depict alternatives**




Informativeness


- In uttering φ , a speaker provides the information that the actual world is contained in $\cup[\varphi]$
- We call $\cup[\varphi]$ the **informative content** of φ , $\text{info}(\varphi)$
- We say that φ is **informative** iff $\text{info}(\varphi) \neq W$




+informative



+informative



-informative



-informative

Inquisitiveness

- In uttering φ , a speaker steers the cg towards a state in $[\varphi]$
- Sometimes, all that is needed to reach such a state is **mutual acceptance** of $\text{info}(\varphi)$
 - \Rightarrow This is the case if $\text{info}(\varphi) \in [\varphi]$
- Otherwise, **additional information** needs to be provided
 - \Rightarrow In this case, i.e., if $\text{info}(\varphi) \notin [\varphi]$, we say that φ is **inquisitive**

Inquisitiveness and alternatives


If W is **finite** (which is the case in all our examples):

- φ is inquisitive $\iff [\varphi]$ contains **at least two alternatives**


Informativeness and inquisitiveness

Summary



- φ is **informative** $\Leftrightarrow \text{info}(\varphi) \neq W$
- φ is **inquisitive** $\Leftrightarrow \text{info}(\varphi) \notin [\varphi] \Leftrightarrow_{fin}$ **at least two alternatives**




+informative
-inquisitive



+informative
+inquisitive



-informative
+inquisitive



-informative
-inquisitive

Entailment

Two natural conditions

In order for φ to entail ψ :

1. φ must be **at least as informative** as ψ : $\text{info}(\varphi) \subseteq \text{info}(\psi)$
2. φ must be **at least as inquisitive** as ψ : $[\varphi] \subseteq [\psi]$

(every piece of information that settles $[\varphi]$ also settles $[\psi]$)

Simplification

- The second condition implies the first
- So: $\varphi \models \psi \iff [\varphi] \subseteq [\psi]$

Algebraic operations

- Just as in the classical setting, the set of all propositions, ordered by entailment, forms a **complete Heyting algebra**
- This means that we have the same **basic operations**:
 1. Meet
 2. Join
 3. Relative pseudo-complementation

Basic inquisitive semantics

As before, **conjunction**, **disjunction**, **implication** & **negation** can be taken to express these basic algebraic operations:


- $[\varphi \wedge \psi] = [\varphi] \cap [\psi]$ **meet**
- $[\varphi \vee \psi] = [\varphi] \cup [\psi]$ **join**
- $[\varphi \rightarrow \psi] = [\varphi] \Rightarrow [\psi]$ **relative pseudo-complement**
- $[\neg\varphi] = [\varphi] \Rightarrow \perp$ **pseudo-complement relative to \perp**

⇒ We enriched the notion of meaning, but we preserved the essence of the classical treatment of the connectives

These connectives have also been considered in dependence logic, see e.g. Abramsky and Väänänen '09, Yang '14. However, the standard DL treatment of disjunction is actually quite different.

Disjunction generates alternatives

- When treated as a **join** operator in the inquisitive setting, disjunction has exactly the **alternative generating** behavior that is assumed in alternative semantics



Interim summary

- The treatment of disjunction in **alternative** semantics can be reconciled with the classical treatment of disjunction as **join**
- In the inquisitive setting, the two **essentially coincide**
- All the phenomena dealt with in alternative semantics can be accounted for without giving up the idea that disjunction expresses one of the basic algebraic operations on meanings
- One concrete case: the **Stalnaker/Lewis account** of counterfactuals is compatible with treating **disjunction** as **join**

(contra the general assumption since Fine '75, Nute '75, Ellis et.al. '77)


Roadmap

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2. Alternative semantics: disjunction generates alternatives
3. How inquisitive semantics reconciles these two views
4. Some broader **repercussions** for semantics and logic


Uniform treatment of declaratives and interrogatives

The inquisitive framework presented here allows for a **uniform** semantic treatment of declaratives and interrogatives

(3) Carla speaks Spanish.



(4) Does Carla speak Spanish?




Logical operations **apply uniformly** to both types of sentences


(Ciardelli, Groenendijk & Roelofsen '13b)

Uniform treatment of conjunction

- (5) Carla speaks Spanish and she speaks French.




- (6) Does Carla speak Spanish, and does she speak French?




Uniform treatment of conditionals

- (7) If John goes to the party, Mary will go as well.



- (8) If John goes to the party, will Mary go as well?




Generalized entailment

- Entailment applies **uniformly** to declaratives and interrogatives
 - **Declarative entails declarative:** Everyone left \models Bill left
 - **Declarative entails interrogative:** Everyone left \models Who left?
 - **Interrogative entails interrogative:** Who left? \models Did Bill leave?
- So entailment is no longer just about **inference**, but also about **resolution** and **subquestions**
- In the propositional setting, entailment can be **axiomatized** by extending intuitionistic logic with:
 1. Atomic double negation: $\neg\neg p \rightarrow p$
 2. Kreisel-Putnam: $(\neg\chi \rightarrow \varphi \vee \psi) \rightarrow (\neg\chi \rightarrow \varphi) \vee (\neg\chi \rightarrow \psi)$
- The first-order completeness problem is still open.

(Ciardelli '09, Ciardelli & Roelofsen '11)

Projection operators


- Propositions inhabit a **two-dimensional space**:



- We can define **projection operators** that obliterate one dimension of meaning, while leaving the other intact
- This can be done **in terms of our basic algebraic operations**

Projection operators


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Projection operators in natural language

- It may be expected that **natural languages** generally have ways to **express** these **projection operators**
- Indeed, this is precisely what declarative and interrogative **clause type markers** may be taken to do

(9) Hector knows **that** Achilles left. **that = !**

(10) Hector knows **whether** Achilles left. **whether = ?**

Disclaimer

- This is a **first approximation** that only works for simple cases
- The semantics of interrogative clause type markers is actually a bit **more complex**, especially in interaction with disjunction, but the projection operators do play an important role

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Conclusion

An inquisitive perspective on meaning:

- Has given rise to a semantic framework in which formulas are evaluated relative to a **set** of worlds / assignments, rather than a single world / assignment, just as in dependence logic
- Allows us to reconcile two prominent views on **disjunction**, and yields a principled treatment of other connectives as well
- Facilitates a uniform semantic treatment of **declarative** and **interrogative** sentences, and combinations thereof
- Provides richer **logical foundations** for the analysis of **information exchange** through linguistic communication

Thank you

For a handout version of these slides, including references, see:

www.illc.uva.nl/inquisitivesemantics